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'116 [27 C.2d 
[L. A. No: 1§477. In Bank. Mar. 14, 1946.] ., 
ESTHER HEATON, Respondent, v. MILTON KERLAN, 
M.D. et al., Defendants; ASSOCIATED INDEMNITY 
CORPORATION (a C~p'oration), Appellant. 
". 
[1] Workmen's Compensation-Actions Against Third Persons.-
Lien for Expenditures.~The expenditures for "compensation" 
for which a lien is allowed the employer or his insurance car-
rier on the injured employee's recovery against a third person 
(Lab. Code, § 3856), include expenditures for all benefits con-
ferred on the employee by Lab. Code, §§ 3201-6002 (see 
§ 3207). and therefore include expenditures for medical and 




awarded (§§ 4650-4663). 
ld.-Award-Scope.-An award of workmen's compensation 
included compensation for disability by malpractice of the 
doctor who diagnosed and treated the employee's fractured 
arm for a sprain, where the award was made over 17 months 
after the last of the doctor's treatments, and where the fact . 
that the award was based on the condition of the injury after 
the treatments and a subsequent operation was established 
by a finding that the employee's injuries included "permanent 
disability consisting of loss of heai! and neck of radius of 
minor forearm." 
ld.-Compensable Injuries-Rendering Service at Time.-Re-
covery of compensation is not conditional on the employee'. 
rendering service to the employer at the time of the injury. 
ld.-Compensable Injuries-Aggravated Injuries Due to !fecti-] 
cal Treatment.-The rule that the aggravation of injuries by' 
the negligence of a doctor is within the scope of the risk 
ereated by the original tortious act, applies in workmen's com-' 
pensa.tion cases. (Disapproving of Smith v. Golde" State Ho .. 
pital, 111 Cal.App. 667. 296 P. 127.) 
[1] See 27 OaJ.Jur. 274. 
[4] Workmen's Compensation Act as affecting liability of or 
remedy against employer for injury due to medical or surgical 
treatment of employee after injury, note, 127 A.L.R. 1108. See, 
also,27 OaLJur. 423. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 6, 8, 10, 11] Workmen's Compensa-
tion, § 35; [2] Workmen's Compensation, § 191(1); [3] Workmen'. 
Compensation, § 77; [4, 9] Workmen's Compensation, § 116; [5] 
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[5] ld.-Actions Aga.inst Thirtd Persons-Appeal-Moot Questions. 
-In a malpractice action by an injured employee against a 
doctor who treated t(e injury, wherein the employer's com-
pensation insurance carrier filed a lien on any judgment that 
might be recovered, an appeal f:r:om a judgment dismissing the 
application after sustaining a oiiemurrer thereto did not be-
come moot on the ground ~t th(' employee's judgment had 
been fully satisfied, where the insurance carrier filed its notice 
of appeal before the doctor satisfied said judgment, and where, 
in view of Lab. Code, § 3858, the doctOl could not destroy the 
lien by satisfying the judgment without first giving the em-
ployer a reasonable opportunity to perfect and satisfy his 
lien. 
[6] ld.-Actions Against Third Persons-Lien for Expenditures.-
In an action by an employee against a third person on account 
of injuries to the employee, wherein the employer's compen-
sation insurance carrier files a lien on any judgment that might 
be recovered, the court has jurisdiction to fix the amount of 
the lien. (See Lab. Code, §§ 3852, 3853, 3856, 3857.) 
[7] ld.-Award-Oonclusiveness and EJfect.-When the Industrial 
Accident Commission has made an award fixing the compen-
sation to which an injured employee is entitled, the award will 
govern any later determinatioln as to what was payable as 
compensation under the award. 
[8] ld.-Actions Against Third Persons-Lien for Expenditures.-
Where compensation is paid by the empioyer to an injured 
employee without proceedings in the Industrial Accident Com-
mission, the court in ascertaining the amount of the lien to be 
allowed the employer or his insurance carrier on the employee's 
recovel'I against a third person, must determine what amount 
was or will be properly expended in fulfillment of the employ-
er's duty to compensate the employee. 
[9] ld.-Oompensable Injuries-Aggravated Injuries Due to Medi-
cal Treatment.-8ince an injured employee is entitled to com-
pensation for the injury including the aggravation thereof 
caused by a doctor's malpractice, the commission need not 
determine to what extent the employee's disability was caused 
by the malpractice. Awards for disability are based on the 
ultimate result of the accident, and the employee is entitled 
to recover for the extent of his disability based on such result, 
regardless of the fact that the disability has been aggravated 
and increased by the intervening negligence of the doctor. 
[10] ld.-Actions Against Third Persons-Lien for Expenditures. 
-The amount of the lien to be allowed the employer or his 
insurance carrier on the injured employee's recovery in • mal-
practice action is equal to the amount of compensation paid or 
payable, including medical expenditures Dot covered by the 
) 
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commission's award, that was attributable to the malpractice 
of the doctor who treated tile injury. In other words, the 
amount of the employer's"l.ien is limited to the amount that 
he is required to pay because of the malpractice. 
[11] ld.-Actions Against Third Ppsons-Lien for Expenditures. 
-Under Lab. Code, § 3856, the emp~yer's lien on the injured 
employee's recovery against a third person attaches to the 
entire judgment, and it is not necessary to segregate the put 
thereof that represents damages for pain 'and suffering. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County dismissing an application for a lien after 
sustaining a demurrer thereto. Walter S. Gates, Judge. 
Reversed. 
Syril S. Tipton for Appellant. 
Lyndol L. Young as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Appellant. ; 
F. Murray Keslar for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Respondent Esther Heaton fractured her 
left arm in the course of her employment as a masseuse. Her 
employer carried workmen's compensation' insurance with 
appellant Associated Indemnity Corporation, and respondent 
was treated by a doctor selected by appellant. The doctor, I 
without taking an X-ray of respondent's arm, diagnosed and: 
treated for a sprain. The arm did not knit, and by the time I 
another doctor discovered the fracture, it became necessary 
to remove the head of the radius, and the arm was perma-
nently disabled. 
On January 20, 1942, respond-ent brought an action against 
the doctor for malpractice and recovered a judgment for: 
$20,000, which was later reduced to $8,000. Actions against 
other doctors were dismissed. On August 19, 1942, the Indus-
trial Accident Commission found that respondent had a per-
manent disability of 1614 per cent and awarded her $1,625 
in permanent disability benefits, and appellant paid the award. 
Before the trial of the malpractice action, appellant filed an 
application under section 3856 of the Labor Code- for a lien 
·"The court shall first apply, out of the entire amount of any judgment 
for any damage recovered by the employee, a 8Ilfficient amount to reim.' 
burse the employer for the amount of his expenditures for compensation., 
If the employer has not joined in the action or has not brought aetion, 
or if his action has not been consolidated, the court, on his application 
shall allow, as a first lien against the entire amount of any judgm8llt 
for any damages recovered by the employee, the amount of the employer'a 
expenditures for compensation." (Lab. Code, 13856.) 
) 
) 
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upon any judgment--that might be recovered in the action. 
Respondent's motion to strike the application was granted, 
a demurrer by the doctor thereto was sustained without leaye 
to amend, and a judgment fJ.f dismissal was entered. This 
appeal followed. ., 
Appellant contends that by vil'4le of its alleged lien, it has 
a right to reimbursement out of the proceeds of the judgment 
against the doctor for that part of the award, allegedly 
amounting to $1,425, and for that part of tlLe medical expen-
ditures, allegedly totalling $246.05, exceeding the disability 
benefits and medical payments to which respondent would 
have been entitled had there been no malpractice. 
[1] The payment of an award that includes compensation 
for negligent treatment of an injury, and the payment of a 
judgment for damages caused by the same treatment, would 
amount to double recovery. In this state, however, a double 
recovery is precluded by the provision that the employer or 
his insurance carrier may obtain a lien against the entire 
amount of any judgment for any damages recovered by the 
employee for "the amount of his expenditures for compen-
sation." (Lab. Code, § 3856; San Bernardino Oounty v. In-
dustrial Ace. Oom., 217 Cal. 618, 627, 628 [20 P.2d 673]; 
Evans v. Los Angeles Ry. Oorp., 216 Cal. 495, 498 [14 P.2d 
752]; Jacobsen v. Industrial Ace. Oom., 212 Cal. 440, 447 
[299 P. 66].) The expenditures for "compensation" for 
which a lien is allowed the employer or his insurance carrier 
include expenditures for all benefits conferred on the employee 
by sections 3201-6002 of the Labor Code (Lab. Code, § 3207), 
and therefore include expenditures for medical and hospital 
treatment (ibid., § 4600; Pacific Emp. Ins. 00. v. Industrial 
Ace. Oom., 66 Cal.App.2d 376, 380 [152 P.2d 501]), as well 
as for disability benefits awarded. (Lab. Code, §§ 4650-4663.) 
[2] Respondent contends that the award did not include 
compensation for disability caused by the malpractice. The 
award was made on August 19, 1942, over seventeen months 
after the last of the doctor's treatments. The fact that the 
award was based on the condition of the injury after the 
treatments and the subsequent operation, is established be-
yond dispute by the finding that respondent'. injuries in-
cluded "permanent disability consisting of loss of. head and 
neck of radius of minor forearm.. . • • " 
Respondent also contends that her cause of aetion against 
the doctor for malpractice was separate mel distinct from 
\ 
) 
720 HEATON V. KERLAN~ [27 C.2d 
her claim for workmen's compcnsition, and that the ag-
gravated injury resulting from the negligent treatment by 
the doctor was not incurred in the course of htr employment 
(Lab. Code, § 3600 (b» since she was not rendering any serv-
ice to her employer at the tim~ of the treatments. She con-
cludes that even if compenmtion for the injuries caused by 
the malpractice was included in the award, the commission, by 
including such compensation, exceeded its jurisdiction. [3] Re-
covery of compensation is not conditiopal upon the employee'8 
rendering service to the employer at the time of the injury. 
(California Cas. Indemnity Exch. v. Indnstrial Ace. Com., 21 
Cal.2d 461, 465 [132 P.2d 815] and cited cases.) [4] It has 
been settled by decisions in tort actions that the aggravation 
of injuries by the negligence of a doctor is within the scope ' 
of the risk created by the original tortious act. (Ash v. Mor-
tenson, 24 Cal.2d. 654, 657 [150 P.2d 876]; Dewhirst v. Leo-
pold, ]94 Cal. 424 [229 P. 30]: Blackwell v. American Film 
Co., 189 Cal. 689 [209 P. 9991; Boa v. San Francisco-Oakland 
Term. Rys., 182 Cal. 93 []87 P. 2]; Fields v. Mankato Elec. 
Traction Co., 116 Minn. 218 [133 N.W. 577] ; see Rest .. Torts, 
§~ 457,872; Prosser on Torts, 362: 39 A.L.R. 1268.) The same 
rule applies in this state in workmen's compensation cases; 
" ... 'under the great weight of authority the employer is 
liable for all legitimate consequence.'l following an accident, 
inclmlillA' unskilfulness or error of judgment of the physician 
furnished as required, and the employee is entitled to reeover 
Illlder the schedule of compensation for the extent of his 
(lisa hilit:-;" based on the ultimate result of the accident, regard- i 
less of the fact that thp. disability has been aggravated and . 
increas('d by the intervening negligence or carelessness of the 
('mplo?er's selected physician.' The reasonableness of this 
prinriple is patent." (Fitzpatrick v. Fidelity & Casua.lty 
Co .. 7 ~f' 1.2d 230. 234 r 60 P.2d 276J; D~7.1(Lrd v. Oity of Los 
A.nnpl('.~ 20 Ca1.2d 599. 604 rt27 P.2d 917]: Nelson v. Asso-
dated Indemnity Oorpora.tion, 19 CaI.App.2d 564 [66 P.2d 
H~41: see 39 A.L.R 12i6: 98 A.L.R. 1387: 127 A.hR. 1108; 
13n A.TJ.R. ]010: 7] C.J. 641 et 8eq.) 
Parific ronst CasllaUy Co. v. Pillsbur11, 171 Cal. 319 [153 P. 
241. on which respondent relies, is clearly distinguishable, 
since it involved a refracture of the old break after the em-
ployment han ceased. (Of. Head Dn1ling 00. v. Industrial 
Ace. rom .. 177 Cnl. 194 f170 P. 157]; Shell Co. of California 
v. Industrial Ace. Com., 36 Ca1.App. 463 1172 P. 611]; Shaw 
) 
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v. Owl Drug 00., 4 Cal.App.~ 191 [40 P.2d 588]; Brown v. 
Beck, 63 Cal.App. 686 [22<J P. 14]; Rest., Torts, § 460.) 
Smith v. Golden State Hospital, 111 Cal.App. 667 [296 P. 
127], on which respondent also relies, held that receipt of 
compensation for additional injuries c'aused by malpractice 
does not bar recovery by the employee from the negligent 
doctor in an action for dam{ges. Language in that case that 
negligence in the treatment of an injury is not within the 
scope of the risk created by the injury is inconsistent with the 
Fitzpatrick. Dillard and Nelson case~. supra, and is disap-
proved. 
[6] Respondent contends that the present appeal has be-
come moot on the ground that her judgment has been fully 
satisfied and that no lien can therefore attach thereto. Appel-
lant filed its notice of appeal, however. before the doctor satis-
fied respondent's judgment. If an employee has obtained a 
judgment against a third person for hi'! compensable injury, 
"No satisfaction of such judgment in whole or in part, shall 
be valid without giving the employer notice and a reasonable 
opportUJl1ty to perfect and sati'lfy his lien." (Lab. Code, 
~ 3858. ) The employer is denied such an opportunity if, 
during the pendeney of his appeal. the judgment is satisfied 
and no arrangement is made to protect the lien. The doctor 
could not therefore destroy the lien by satisfying the judg-
ment. 
Since appellant is entitled to a lien, the motion to strike 
should have been denied and the demurrer overruled. 
[6] The contention has been advanced that even if appel-
lant is entitled to a lien. only the Industrial Accident Com-
mission has jurisdiction to fix the amount thereof. Section 
5300 of the Labor Code provideI'! that proceedings for "the 
recovery of compensation. or concerning' any right or liability 
arising out of or incidental thereto" IIha11 be "inst.it.uted 
before the commission and not elsewhere. except as ot.herwise 
provided in Divi'lions IV and V." It is provided in division 
IV of the Labor Code that the court has jurisdiction to deter-
mine the amount of the lien. Under chapter 5 of division IV. 
an employer or his insurance carrier may obtain reimburs~ 
ment for expenditure..q in compensating his employee for an 
injury caused by a third person bv bringing an action against 
Rllch person (Lab. Code. ~ 3852). by joining' in an action 
brought by the employee (I.Jab. Code. § 3853). or if both 
actions were brought independently, .by consolidating them 
) 
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(Lab. Code, § 3853), 01" by claiming a lien in a judgment for 
any damages recove~d by the employee. (Lab. Code, § 3856.) 
These remedies are expressly within the jurisdiction of the 
court. Thus sections 3856 and 3857 provide: "The court shall 
first apply, out of the entire 8.Vl0unt of any judgment for any 
damage recovered by the employee, a sufficient amount to re-
imburse the employer for the amount of his expenditures for 
compensation. If the employer has not joined in the acHon 
or has not brought action. or if his action has not been con-
solidated, the court, on his application shan allow, as a first 
lien against the entire amount of any jJIdgment for any dam-
ages recovered by the employee, the amount of the employer's 
expenditures for compensation." (Lab. Code, § 3856.) "The 
court shall, npon further application at any time before the 
judgment is satisfled, allow as a further lien the amonnt of 
any· expenditures of the employer . . . subsequent to the 
original order." (Lab. Code, § 3857.) It clearly appears from 
these provisions that the court has jurisdiction to fix the 
amount of the lien. (Jacobsen v. Industrial Ace. Com., 212 
Cal. 440. 448 [299 P. 66].) 
[7] When the Industrial Accident Commission has made 
an award fixing the compensation to which the employee is 
entitled, the award will govern any later determination as 
to what was payable as compensation under the award. An 
award, however. may relate only to part of the compensation, 
su('h as disabi1it~, benefits. leaving uncovered such expenditures 
as those for medical and hospital treatment. [8] FreCluently i 
compensation is paid by the employer without proceedin~ in: 
the Industrial Accident Commission. In such cases the court i 
in ascertaining the amount of t.he lien, must determine what 
amount was or will be properly expended in fulfillment of 
the employer's duty to compensate the emnloyee. Of oreno 
v. Los Angeles Transfer 00., 44 Cal.App. 551. 554 [186 P. 
800]: see .Jacobsen v. Ind1Mtrial Ace. Com., supra, 212 Cal. 
440. 448.) [9] In the present case the commission determined 
the amount of the disability benefits to which respondent was 
entitled under the act. but it did not determine what part 
thereof was attributable to the aggravation of respondent's 
injury caused by the doctor's malpractice. Since respondent 
was entitled to compensation for the injury including such 
aggravation. the commission had no reason to determine to 
what extent respondent's disability was caused by the mal-
practice, or the amount of compensation payable for disability 
80 caused. Awards for disability are based em. the ultimate 
) 
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result of the accident; " ... the ,fmployee is entitled to recover 
under the schedule of compensation for the extent of his dis-
a bility based on the ultimatt!'" result of the accident, regardless 
of the fact that the disability hM been aggra.va.ted and in-
creased by the intervening negligence or carelessness of the 
pmployer's !'lelected physician'." (Fi'h:patrick v. Pidelity &; 
Casualty Co., supra, 7 Cal~d 2::10. 2::14: Dillard v. City of Los 
.4.ngeles, supra, 20 Ca1.2d !)!l9. 604: Nelson v. Associated In-
demnitll Corporation, supra, 19 Cal.App.2d 564; see Parchef-
sky v. Kroll Bros., Inc .. 267 N.Y. no. 417 f196 N.E. 308. 98 
A.L.R. 1387]; 27 Cal.Jur. 423.) Whether or not there was 
malpractice had to be determined in the action against the 
doctor. Given this determination. it remains to be determined 
what aggravation of the original injury resulted from the 
malpractice. [10] The amount of appellant's lien is equal 
to the amount of compensation paid or payable. including 
medical expenditures not covered b~' the award. that was at-
tributable to the malpractice. In other words the amount of 
the employer's lien ill limited to the am01mt thRt he ill required 
to pay because of the malpractice. 
[11] The employer's lien attaches to the "entire amount" 
of a judgment "ror any damages." (Lab. Code, § 3856.) 
The Legislature 110 defined the lien (Stat.c;. 1931, p. 2370. Deer-
ing's Gen. Laws. ]931. Act 4749) after this court held that 
the lien of the employer under t.he former Rtatute did not 
attach to that part of a jl1dmnent Tepresenting damages for 
the employee's pain and suffering. and suggested that the 
difficulties of lIegregatinl! the elements of the employee'R Te· 
covery "mi/!ht well can for further le/rlslativp action on the 
subject." (Jacobsen v. Tnd1(.strial Ace. Com., supra. 212 Cal. 
440. 449.) Under the statute as amended. it is clear that the 
employer's lien attaches to the entire judgment and that it is 
no longer necessary to segregate the part thereof that rep-
resent.c; damages for pain and suffering. (Pacific Gas &; Elec-
tric Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 8 Cal.App.2d 499, 504 [47 
P.2d 783J.) 
The judgment of dismissal is reversed. 
Gibtion, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., 
and Spence, J., concurred. 
